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The rise of the emerging southern economies – China, India, Brazil, and South Africa 
(CIBS) – as both economic and political actors, is having significant and far-reaching 
impact on the world economy. Notwithstanding the increasing amount of study and 
research, there are still important knowledge-gaps with respect to a range of likely 
consequences of the dynamism of the Southern Economies. One of these gaps concerns 
the implications for the WTO-multilateral trading system. The present paper proposes a 
review of the southern participation in the multilateral integration process and suggests 
a methodology to assess the impact of CIBS’ rise on the future of the WTO system. 
Through the analysis of the trajectories of ‘impact’ of the trade channel, the paper draws 
some suggestive remarks. 
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1  Introduction 
The global trading system – designed after the Second World War to promote tariff 
reductions on trade through multilateral negotiations – has been characterized by the 
poor participation of developing countries (DCs) until recently (Srinivasan 1999). The 
biggest impact of DCs on agendas and staking out positions occurred as recently as the 
negotiations for the Doha Round but it was at the 5th Ministerial that was held in 
Cancún in September 2003 that DCs really proved they are able to form, lead and 
maintain negotiating coalitions, even in the face of bilateral deals between the major 
players, EU and the US (Hoekman 2003). On this occasion, they (particularly the larger 
countries) showed that they were prepared to break up negotiations at the Ministerial 
level on the grounds that they were not receiving a balanced package of concessions 
(Baldwin R. E. 2006). This change of conduct reflects the increasing importance of the 
developing world in the international context. DCs now account for one-third of world 
trade and have been asking for a more active involvement in the decision making 
process and more weight in the choices of international trade policy.  
Within the developing world the rise of the emerging southern economies – China, 
India, Brazil, and South Africa (CIBS) – as both economic and political actors, is 
having significant and far-reaching impact. Thanks to their economic growth and size, 
CIBS have emerged as important powers, at a regional as well as at a global level, 
accounting together for about 40 per cent of world population and approximately 10 per 
cent of the value of world GDP (World Bank 2006a). They have acquired leadership 
roles thanks to their ability to formulate policy, articulate the views held by broad 
groups of DCs, and because their size and political sophistication makes them less 
subject to coercion by the industrialized countries (Humphrey and Messner 2005). 
It stands to reason that the world economy in general and WTO system in particular are 
undergoing a process of rapid change linked to the emergence of these new leading 
actors on the international scene. Consequently, during the last few years there has been 
an increasing recognition of the growing power of the Southern economies that has 
generated a large amount of attention and research. Most of the analyses aimed at 
assessing the overall impact of CIBS rise have been focussing on the linkages through 
which CIBS might affect the world economy, namely: growth and global production 
networks; trade and financial flows; environmental externalities; governance. 
Notwithstanding the increasing amount of study and research, there are still important 
knowledge-gaps with respect to a range of likely consequences of the dynamism of the 
Southern economies. One of these gaps concerns the implications for the WTO-
multilateral trading system. In fact, few scholars are asking the question: ‘what impact 
will CIBS have on the multilateral trading system in terms of world trade patterns, trade 
interests and conflicts, balance of powers and WTO effectiveness and functioning’. 
This question has important implications for the future of the multilateral rules-based 
system. To anticipate some significant trends such as changing trade patterns, the 
emergence of new trade clusters and the building of different trade blocs means 
foreseeing the rise of new conflicting interests on the multilateral agenda, the shift in the 
balance of powers, the building of ad hoc and or stable coalitions, the organizing of 
voting blocs, etc. In other words, it means foreseeing the actual menaces to the good and 
efficacious functioning of the WTO system in the future.    2
The aim of this paper is to examine this fundamental issue, which has been poorly 
analyzed to date, and to seek to offer a key to the reading of the likely impact that the 
Southern economies’ dynamism may have on the current multilateral trading system. To 
achieve this the present analysis starts with a review of the southern participation in the 
multilateral integration process since the beginning, from the GATT to the WTO, with 
the aim of shedding light on the specific interests and strategies supported by these 
players during the whole period (Section 2). Subsequently, the paper suggests a 
methodology to assess the impact of CIBS’ rise on the WTO system (Section 3) and 
continues by making a preliminary attempt to draw the trajectories of ‘impact’ that the 
rise in CIBS’ trading is beginning to produce on the WTO system (Section 4). The 
paper concludes with some suggestions. 
2  Developing countries, CIBS and the multilateral trading system: from the 
GATT to date 
The global trading system was designed after the Second World War to promote tariff 
reductions on trade through multilateral negotiations. When the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in 1947, the original twenty-three contracting 
parties included the following DCs: Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, India, 
Lebanon, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, and South Africa (see the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947). 
2.1  The growing participation of Developing countries in the multilateral trading 
system 
DCs have shared a certain ambivalence toward the GATT from its origins that resulted 
in their limited participation and effectiveness in formal, multilateral negotiations 
(Srinivasan 1999). They were convinced that despite its one-member-one-vote system, 
the GATT promoted the interests of developed countries rather than theirs due to its 
commitment to liberalization, lack of balancing development provisions or special 
treatment for primary commodities, and the existence of the Green Room that worked to 
their exclusion. Hence the agenda of DCs in the first phase of their participation in the 
GATT was primarily characterized by the demand for preferential treatment which took 
two forms: special market access for the DCs products, and exemptions from GATT 
obligations (Narlikar 2005). 
Their efforts to bring development onto the agenda of the GATT negotiations led to the 
establishments of the Committee on Trade and Development and to add, in 1965, 
Part IV into the agreement, devoted specifically to Trade and Development. In 1971, 
waiving the MFN principle, the GATT allowed the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) and afterwards the ‘Enabling Clause’ (Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of DCs).1 
Until the Tokyo Round, many DCs did not participate effectively, and they had no 
significant influence on the outcomes of the previous rounds, because they were 
                                                 
1  It is worth noting that these ‘concessions’ granted to developing countries were defined by Srinivasan 
(2006) mostly rhetorical, always heavily qualified, and their benefits small.   3
fragmented. The GATT was run by the Quad (US, EU, Canada, and Japan) despite the 
increasing numerical weight of DCs. They participated more actively and had a greater 
influence on the Uruguay Round agreement when they began to realize that they could 
not influence the expanding rules of the GATT by standing on the sidelines. Under the 
Uruguay Round, DCs agreed to include the so-called ‘new issues’ in negotiations 
(services, intellectual property and investment) and, in return, agriculture and textiles 
and clothing were placed within the multilateral rules of the GATT (Finger and Schuler 
2000; Narlikar 2006).  
The establishment of the WTO marked a radical change in the DCs’ actions. Since the 
mid 1990s, they have started to play a more pro-active role in the trading system. After 
Seattle, DCs started to manifest their willingness and desire to participate actively in the 
WTO (also advancing proposals on institutional reform within the WTO). The 
prominence of their coalitions and their effectiveness in trade negotiations has increased 
as much as their participation in the WTO. 
In the run-up to the Doha Ministerial Conference many new coalitions of DCs emerged, 
hoping to influence the agenda-setting process. As a result, the November 2001 ‘Doha 
Development Agenda’ put development concerns at the core of WTO deliberations, in 
part because of the perception that the need for development was more urgent than ever 
(Montalbano and Nenci 2006).  
The biggest impact on framing agendas and staking out positions occurred as recently as 
the negotiations for the Doha Round. At the 5th Ministerial that was held in Cancún in 
September 2003 DCs proved they are able to form, lead and maintain negotiating 
coalitions, even in the face of bilateral deals, which were coming from the EU and 
the US. The Cancún Ministerial Meeting was to set the negotiations back on track after 
the setbacks of having missed several crucial deadlines set at Doha. The attention of the 
developing coalitions focused primarily on agriculture and the so called ‘Singapore 
issues’ (competition, foreign investment, government procurement and trade 
facilitation). The agriculture issue is important both for middle-income exporters such 
as Argentina, Brazil, and Thailand, and for poor countries such as Benin and Burkina 
Faso while the Singapore issues are of particular concern to many low-income African 
and the least developed countries governments, as well as a number of more advanced 
countries (Hoekman 2003). A noteworthy aspect of the Cancún Conference was that 
DCs came prepared to push for specific negotiating targets and modalities. 
2.2  The CIBS’ role in trade negotiations  
CIBS are now also gaining importance as influential global players. They have acquired 
leadership roles thanks to their ability to formulate policy and to articulate the views 
held by broad groups of DCs, and because their size and political sophistication makes 
them less subject to pressure by the industrialized countries (Humphrey and Messner 
2005). All CIBS were original members of the GATT (even if China withdrew from the 
GATT after the 1949 revolution, it acceded to the WTO at the end of 2001). China, 
India, Brazil, and South Africa are individually and collectively an important force at 
the WTO. Their experience in the multilateral trading system demonstrates well that the 
group of DCs is diverse, and is not always united in its interests.   4
It is noteworthy that since the early years of the GATT, the role of middle powers such 
as Brazil and India from the developing world has been prominent. Both have played a 
leading role in formulating and voicing the demands of the South in the GATT since the 
negotiations for the aborted International Trade Organization in the middle of the 1940s 
and as original signatories of the GATT. The role of CIBS – though not a monolithic 
bloc – was relevant also in the Uruguay Round. In the ministerial what of Punta del Este 
in 1986, which launched the Uruguay Round, there was a group of ten DCs, the G-10, 
led by Brazil and India. On that occasion, the G-10 attempted to block the inclusion of 
services into the Uruguay Round, and refused to engage in any trade-offs until its 
demands were met (Narlikar 2005; 2006). 
The potential power was indeed revealed at the Cancún Meeting, where CIBS formed 
the G-20 with some other important WTO developing members to articulate and 
negotiate on agriculture for the DCs. The G-20 arose as a reaction to the EU-US text on 
agriculture, which was considered inadequate by most of the DCs even if they were 
supporting different interests. Brazil and India, which drafted the initial text, were 
joined in their counter-proposal by China, South Africa and Argentina and a large group 
of other DCs. The G-20 is also remarkable for: including both China and India, 
countries with very different farming interests from those of Brazil, South Africa, and 
Argentina; keeping together the Cairns Group exporters and the defensive food 
importers; and combining some of the largest and most powerful members of the 
developing world with some of the smallest (Narlikar and Tussie 2004). Furthermore, it 
was the first coalition in which China played a leading role since it became a member of 
the WTO. At first, China appeared to consider the G-20 as a convenient shelter. Having 
made an enormous effort to qualify for WTO membership, it was initially unwilling to 
make significant new commitments in the Doha Round, but after reviewing its position 
it probably perceived the risk of dwindling credibility if they maintained that stance 
(Sutherland 2005). 
The G-20 also contributed to the establishment of other groups (Table 1), such as: the 
G-33 group of poor WTO members which sought to protect their agricultural sectors 
from the impact of a tariff-cutting deal; the African, Caribbean, and Pacific nations 
(known as ACP countries), which were worried about loosing some long-standing trade 
preferences; the G-90 which brought together the African Group, ACP, and the LDC 
groupings on a broad range of concerns including ‘Special and Differential Treatment’. 
The negotiations collapsed after the G-20 refused to negotiate on the ‘Singapore issues’ 
given the lack of broad commitment by the developed countries to reduce agricultural 
subsidies and lower import barriers on agricultural products. The Cancún meeting 
showed that DCs, and particularly the larger countries, were prepared to break up 
negotiations at the Ministerial level when not receiving a balanced package of 
concessions (Baldwin R. E. 2006; Hoekman 2003). 
After Cancún, the multilateral agenda was set by a new Group of 5, which included the 
United States, the EU, Brazil, India, and Australia (as a representative of the Cairns 
Group of agriculture-exporting countries). Brazil and India had attempted to keep their 
G-20 allies informed about the consultations, but many non-members felt that they had 
been marginalized in the process. 
During 2007, under the threat of a failure of the global trade talks, the European Union, 
the United States with India and Brazil, made a last, desperate attempt to save trade   5
talks trying to narrow down some of their widely diverging proposals in agriculture and 
manufacturing and achieve a compromise. Some implications emerged from it: a shift 
has occurred in the ‘balance of power’ in the WTO. It could however open up a likely 
cleavage among DCs. After the collapse of the latest session of Doha-round talks in 
June, some DCs expressed much concern about the role played by CIBS. The poorest 
countries in Africa and elsewhere charge that the emerging market economies are 
ignoring their needs. India and Brazil, for instance, came to the final negotiations in 
Potsdam, Germany, last June with a proposal that called for drastic cuts in American 
farm subsidies, which was expected. But the two countries also proposed that they 
themselves lower their own tariffs by a smaller amount than anyone expected.  
3  Assessing the impact of the rise of CIBS on the WTO system 
A set of dominant vectors are commonly taken into consideration when assessing the 
impact of CIBS dynamism on world economy. They are: growth and global production 
networks; trade flows; financial flows; environmental externalities; governance; etc. 
Focussing on the WTO trading system the strongest and most direct vector along which 
CIBS rise is impacting on it is trade. In this context, a key question emerges: what 
impact will CIBS have on the multilateral trading system in terms of world trade 
patterns, regional blocs and WTO effectiveness and functioning? 
A set of critical points emerge from this question, namely: 
9  impact of CIBS production, size and trade growth on the current multilateral 
trading system; 
9  losers and winners from the growing dynamism and trade specialization of CIBS 
in the multilateral trading system; 
9  conflict of interests inside the WTO among CIBS and high and low–income 
economies in their gains and patterns of trade;  
9  CIBS role in the current regional trade integration processes; 
9  influence of CIBS rise on the governance of the multilateral rules-based system. 
An appropriate methodology to tackle this complex issue is to analyse nexus and inter-
linkages among the following topics:  
-  Trade specialization patterns in goods and services; 
-  Implications for regional integration; 
-  Repercussion on the multilateral governance. 
Concerning the nexus, we should acknowledge that the competitiveness and growth of 
CIBS can affect differentially the WTO economies, changing the framework of world 
trade patterns. Their specialization can generate, in some cases, complementary effects, 
in other cases competitive effects, opening likely conflicts of interest among trade 
partners. This change in trade patterns could lead to the building of new clusters 
between CIBS and economies with similar trade interests. These clusters could interest 
countries belonging to the same geographical area, with the likely result of fostering   6
regional trade integration, eventually South-South. It stands to reason that the 
strengthening of these kinds of regional trade blocks would have serious consequences 
not only on the current Doha Round but on the future of the multilateral trading system. 
Concerning the inter-linkages among the above three aspects, CIBS can be seen as 
competitors for those economies that have similar comparative advantages in the same 
products and/or services. At the same time, CIBS can be seen as driving forces for those 
economies that have complementary production and trade structures, because producers 
can benefit from the demand for their output from CIBS and they can be included in 
regional value chains. To analyse the actual structure of CIBS’ trade patterns it is useful 
to foresee the emergence of new trade interests and conflicts that could lead to the 
building of new clusters. This clustering could drive in its turn, a polarization of trade 
interests and a strengthening of the current regional integration process (with a 
proliferation of both South-South and North-South agreements). If we analyse the recent 
trend of regional agreements we can observe a substantial increase involving a growing 
number of DCs. These developments have considerable repercussions on multilateral 
governance. This trend, combined with the current motley assortment of unilateral, 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements – the so called ‘spaghetti bowl’ of trade deals 
(Baldwin 2006) – could represent a severe menace to the functioning of the current 
WTO system. Moreover, because of the relative lack of progress multilaterally in the 
Doha Round the evolving set of regional agreements could, potentially displace the 
WTO as the leading edge of global reciprocity-based negotiated trade liberalization for 
the next few decades. 
4  The current trends: trade performance and trajectories of ‘impact’ 
According to Section 3, an appropriate appraisal of CIBS’ impact on WTO trading 
system needs to focus on the inter-linkages among the following issues: trade 
specialization patterns, regional integration process, and multilateral governance. 
However, it is easy to derive that deepening the analysis of CIBS’ trade performance is 
a precondition for any valuable assessment of the likely impact of the Southern 
economies’ rise on the multilateral trading system. 
4.1  CIBS trade performance 
China and India, with GDP values of US$7.9 and US$2.8 trillion respectively in 2006 
(Groningen Growth and Development Centre 2007), can be defined as the new ‘giant 
economies’ (Winters and Yusuf 2007). China was the second largest economy in the 
world, after the United States at US$9.3 trillion, while India was fourth after Japan. 
Moreover, CIBS accounted for about 50 per cent of the total GDP of low and middle 
income economies. 
During the last decade CIBS have achieved a significant increase also in their economic 
performance. China and India, in particular, have performed very strongly since 1995. 
China’s GDP grew the fastest at an average rate of 8.8 per cent per year during 1995-
2005, while India grew at 6.0 per cent and Brazil and South Africa registered a more 
modest GDP growth rate of 2.1 and 3.1 respectively (World Bank 2006a).   7
The performance of CIBS has also been relevant in terms of trade that can be 
considered the strongest channel through which the growth of CIBS affects other 
countries. The four economies are currently the leading exporters and importers – both 
in merchandise and services – in their respective regions. CIBS trade growth has been 
particularly relevant during the last decade (Table 2) and China’s trade expansion since 
1978 has been extraordinary. India’s trade began to grow following changes in trade 
policies in the 1980s and even more so after the 1991 reforms (Srinivasan 2006).  
Within trade aggregates, China is a significant importer and exporter of manufactured 
goods, with market shares of 6 per cent and 7.3 per cent, respectively, in 2005 (Table 3). 
It holds the third place as world exporter and importer of merchandise and, respectively, 
the ninth and seventh in commercial services (where China’s weight in world trade is 
3.0 of total world exports and 3.5 in total imports). Focussing on trade by commodities, 
Chinese main exports are (Table 4): electronic equipment (22.6 per cent of total 
exports); machinery and mechanical appliances (19.6 per cent); articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories (8.63 per cent); optical, photo, technical, medical, etc. apparatus 
(3.4 per cent). Of the first group the leading products are: computer equipment, 
telecommunications equipment and, office equipment. It is noteworthy to consider 
however that the contribution to Chinese trade balance of this industry is negative, as 
shown by Lafay index, and that Balassa Index is also weak (Table 4).  
India’s largest export category is manufacturing (0.9 of total world exports and 1.3 of 
total imports, see Table 3). Main export commodities are (Table 4): natural or cultured 
pearls, precious or semi-precious stones (15.3 per cent), but also mineral fuels, mineral 
oils and products of their distillation (11.5 per cent), especially heavy petrol/bitum oils; 
articles of apparel, accessories (5.3 per cent); organic chemicals (4.7 per cent); ores, 
slag and ash (4.3 per cent), particularly iron ore/concentrates. In this case the 
contribution to trade balance is negative in the case of mineral fuels, mineral oils and 
products of their distillation. It is noteworthy to underline that in the case of India, 
market shares in the world trade are more relevant in the service sector than in the 
merchandise ones (2.2 of total world exports and 2.1 of total imports against 
respectively 0.9 and 1.3, see Table 3). The most dynamic export sector is information 
technology (IT)-enabled services for global companies, including call centers and 
software application, design, and maintenance. However, despite their dynamism, 
India’s overall exports of commercial services are less than those of China (India is 
ranked 12th for exports and 15th for imports in world commercial services trade, see 
Table 3).  
Less extraordinary – but no less important – is the weight of Brazil and South Africa on 
world trade. The first account for a share of 1.1 per cent of world trade exports and 0.7 
per cent of total imports of the merchandise trade but with a lower share in the 
commercial services sector (0.6 per cent and 0.9 per cent respectively). The latter 
accounts for a share of about 0.5 per cent both in merchandise and the commercial 
services sector (Table 3).  
Brazil also shows a lower degree of export polarization compared to the other CIBS 
(Table 4). Its main exports are vehicles (9.9 per cent of total exports); machinery and 
mechanical appliances (8.3 per cent); iron and steel (7.3 per cent); ores, slag and ash 
(6.7 per cent); meat and edible meat offal (6.1 per cent). South Africa main exports are: 
natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones (18.1 per cent); iron and 
steel (12.3 per cent); mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation (10.4   8
per cent); vehicles (8.7 per cent) and machinery and mechanical appliances (7.6 per 
cent). Also in this case, the item mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their 
distillation show a negative contribution to trade balance as well as vehicles and 
machinery and mechanical appliances (see Lafay Index in Table 4). 
A comparative picture of CIBS trade performance shows that China leads the others in 
almost all product categories. The comparative trade performance of China is indeed 
impressive considering that in the top five commodities exported it is one of the big five 
exporters in the world (three times out of five it is the biggest exporter!). It is 
noteworthy that Brazil and South Africa are never in the top ten with the exception of 
exports of ores, while India appears in the top ten, other than in the case of ores, also for 
the exports of natural or cultured pearls, precious stones, metals, coins as well as articles 
of apparel, clothing accessories (Table 5). 
4.2  The trajectories of ‘impact’ 
Trade specialization patterns 
When we talk about the evolution of trade specialization patterns consequent on CIBS 
rise in the international trade scenario, the ‘losers’ are believed to be those countries 
facing competition from cheap manufactured goods in both their domestic and export 
markets (Messner and Humphrey 2006). In addition, it is commonly believed that the 
biggest challenges will be faced by the developing economies.  
A snapshot of CIBS’ main competitors could indeed be suggestive. By using trade data 
disaggregated at the three-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level 
for the most recent period it is possible to identify the following trends. China’s main 
competitors are the leading industrialized countries (Germany, USA, and Japan) in 
almost all its top exports as well as Italy and France in the field of clothing. Among DCs 
China’s main competitors are Korea and Mexico, together with India and Turkey for 
clothing (Table 6). 
India’s main competitors are USA, Canada, and Belgium among the industrialized 
countries and China among DCs (Table 6), while Brazil and South Africa compete 
again with Germany, Japan, and USA as well as with China and Korea in the 
developing world.  
As it is easy to derive from this quick overview, the issue of the true losers and winners 
with respect to the rise of CIBS in the international trade specialization is not 
straightforward. There are many interdependencies to be analyzed and results are likely 
to change according to the level of aggregation of trade statistics; the time reference 
period as well as the choice of statistical indicators. Moreover, important issues such as 
the measurement of quality differences of exports of the trading partners, and the link 
between FDI flows and the international production networks need to be addressed. 
In spite of this it is relatively easy to identify potential conflicts among trade partners as 
well as new coalition of interests at a regional level.    9
Regional integration process 
During the last decades, although the global approach is fundamentally superior because 
it maximizes the number of foreign markets involved and avoids the economic 
distortions (and political risks) of discrimination among trading partners, there has been 
a rapid growth in the number of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, 
which has led to the current ‘spaghetti bowl’ of trade deals. This situation is very 
unlikely to change for the foreseeable future (Baldwin R. E. 2006; Baldwin 2006). In 
particular, the number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) has significantly 
increased. RTAs have become so widespread that practically all WTO members are 
now parties to one or more of them. According to the WTO, it is estimated that more 
than half of world trade is now conducted under RTAs. Up to July 2007, over 350 RTAs 
had been notified to the GATT/WTO, of which over 240 were notified after January 
1995. In the near future, if RTAs reportedly planned or already under negotiation are 
concluded, the total number of RTAs in force might soon reach 400. 
All CIBS are currently fully involved in regional as well as, bilateral agreements 
showing a particular dynamism in promoting new partnerships. Antkiewicz and 
Whalley (2005) quote that CIBS have concluded 53 regional agreements and have 19 
other in negotiation (Table 7). The majority of these were signed within the last few 
years. The 13 agreements signed before 2000 are mostly simple tariff-based 
arrangements with small entities in the region while the 21 more recent agreements are 
more comprehensive, and are aimed at broader economic partnerships covering not only 
trade goods, but also services, investment and economic co-operation. In addition, India, 
Brazil, and South Africa, are carrying out the establishment of a trilateral commission 
(IBSA) which will include an explicitly three-country arrangement. 
India seems to be the most active CIBS’ negotiators even if it is only recently that it has 
been active in negotiating comprehensive regional trade agreements. Brazil has signed 
only one key regional agreement so far but as a part of Mercosur it has signed a number 
of RTAs. It is also a leading player in negotiations on the Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas (FTAA) which would cover more than thirty countries in Northern, Central, 
and Southern America. China has been active in exploring regional options following its 
accession to the WTO in 2001; while South Africa’s efforts on expanding trade and 
economic co-operation ties have, until recently, been focused on the Southern African 
region and the EU (Antkiewicz and Whalley 2005). 
It is undeniable that the strengthening of regionalism is another critical issue for the 
current WTO multilateral trading system. The question whether regional arrangements 
represent WTO-plus, by accelerating and extending on a non-discriminatory basis the 
liberalization process, or whether they are likely to weaken the WTO by bypassing is 
still open (see Bhagwati 1994; Panagariya 1999; Yamamoto 2002; Baldwin 2006). 
The multilateral governance 
Changing trade patterns, rise of new trade interests and conflicts, strengthening of 
regional integration involving CIBS can have considerable repercussions on multilateral 
governance and pose a threat to the functioning of the current WTO system.  
The multilateral system is already suffering from a number of difficulties that have been 
afflicting it during the last few decades: the spreading of non tariff barriers; the growing   10
criticism towards the decision making process inside the Organization; the abnormal 
increase in the number of cases being laid before the dispute settlement mechanism; 
and, as broadly mentioned above, the mounting active role of DCs. In addition, the 
current impasse of the Doha Round is potentially likely to displace the WTO as the 
leading edge of global reciprocity-based negotiated trade liberalization (Hoekman 2003; 
Legrain 2006). 
In this framework it is useful to seek to reconstruct the stances adopted by each CIBS on 
the multilateral ground to extrapolate some interesting insights into their attitudes to the 
multilateral integration process. 
First of all, it is worth stressing that CIBS’ trade interests and stances inside the WTO-
multilateral regime are divergent. China has kept a low profile within the WTO, instead 
of fighting with other DCs for fairer trading conditions and development support. As an 
emerging power, in fact, it is likely it will benefit more from the maintenance of the 
economic order created by the WTO. India, on the contrary, has frequently presented 
itself as a leader of the developing world. In this respect, it has much in common with 
the current South Africa and Brazil, as these countries have also taken up this role and 
the creation of a democratic G-3 of the South in 2003 (through the IBSA – India, Brazil 
and South Africa Dialogue Forum) and not integrating China, reflected their common 
views and attested their aim to play a more prominent role as non industrialized 
countries (Messner and Humphrey 2006). Brazil, as a major exporter of agricultural and 
agro-industrial goods, has adopted an offensive stance in negotiations on the 
liberalization of trade in agriculture taking place in the WTO, as well as in other 
negotiations. However, Brazil’s position remains ambiguous being at the same time the 
voice of the poor countries and pursuer of self-interests (just think of the role of Brazil 
in voicing multilateral rhetoric while simultaneously adopting regional policies towards 
Mercosur). South Africa does not actively or effectively identify the role of African 
countries within the WTO. It has gradually, and then overtly, diverged from the African 
countries that have claimed a special and differential treatment for years and focussed 
essentially on the agricultural and implementation issues, while South Africa was 
basically in favour of a multilateral and multi-dimensional agenda.  
5 Conclusions 
Developing countries have experienced an increasing involvement in the international 
scenario during the last few decades. Among them, CIBS are having significant and far-
reaching impact on the world economy and are transforming the world economic order 
into a multipolar power constellation.  
Through the analysis of the trajectories of ‘impact’ of the trade channel, the paper has 
drawn the following insights. The snapshot about main CIBS’ competitors suggests that 
CIBS show a high degree of competition with East Asian countries and with a number 
of industrialized countries such as the main European countries and USA. Hence, CIBS 
can be seen as competitors for those economies that have similar comparative 
advantages in the same products and/or services leading to the birth of new conflicts 
between WTO members. CIBS could further exclude other developing economies from 
access to global markets or investment resources and this could increase demand for 
protection by low-income economies and a major rift inside the developing world 
during multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time, the role of CIBS as driving   11
forces for those economies that have a complementary production and trade structure 
may lead to the building of new coalitions among WTO members. The focus on trade 
blocs has stressed the role CIBS are having and their increasing involvement in regional 
integration process even if the question of the ambiguous effects of ‘regionalism’ on 
‘multilateralism’ remains unsolved. Lastly, regarding the role of CIBS in the 
governance of the current multilateral trading system, the paper shows that CIBS do not 
have a monolithic and/or common position: on some occasions, some of them are 
prepared to defend DCs’ position when coincident with theirs while on others they are 
more concerned with in the mere defence of their specific interests and on other 
occasion they are scarcely involved in the question of governance.  
It is nevertheless true that CIBS’ role within the multilateral trading system is far from 
defined. This paper suggests a key to the reading of this multi-dimensional issue and 
represents a step forward to developing a broader comprehension of it. Remarks 
reported here are not causal but suggestive only. Starting with them, there is room for 
additional outstanding research. 
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Table 1: Main GATT/WTO coalitions involving CIBS 
Punta del Este 
Ministerial 1986 
(Uruguay Round) 
G-10  Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Nicaragua, 
Tanzania, Peru, Yugoslavia 
Like Minded Group  Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe + 
Jamaica and Kenya as observers 
TRIPs and Public Health  African Group + Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Venezuela 
Doha Ministerial 
2001 (DDA) 
African Group*  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mail, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
G-20  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, 
South Africa, Thailand, Venezuela (original signatories also 
included Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Peru) 
G-33  Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, 
China, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Korea, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, St 
Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, 




G-90  ACP + African Group + LDCs (actually 64 members) 
Hong Kong 
Ministerial (2005) 
G-5  United States, the EU, Brazil, India, and Australia 
 
Note * = Coalitions that were also active at the Cancún Ministerial. 
Source: WTO and Narlikar (2003). 
Table 2: CIBS export and import levels, 1995-2005 (million dollars) 
Exports 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
World   5,164,000     5,401,000     5,589,000     5,499,000     5,709,000     6,452,000     6,186,000     6,486,000     7,578,000     9,203,000     10,431,000    
Brazil 46,506          47,747          52,994          51,140          48,011          55,086          58,223          60,362          73,084          96,475          118,308         
South Africa   27,853          29,221          31,027          26,362          26,707          29,983          29,258          29,723          36,482          46,029          51,876           
China 148,780        151,048        182,792        183,712        194,931        249,203        266,098        325,596        438,228        593,326        761,954         
India 30,630          33,105          35,008          33,437          35,667          42,379          43,361          49,250          57,085          75,562          95,096           
Imports 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
World   5,284,000     5,545,000     5,738,000     5,681,000     5,920,000     6,724,000     6,481,000     6,740,000     7,857,000     9,556,000     10,783,000    
Brazil 54,137          56,792          63,291          61,135          51,909          59,053          58,640          49,716          50,845          66,433          77,585           
South Africa   30,546          30,182          32,998          29,242          26,696          29,695          28,248          29,267          39,748          55,210          62,304           
China 132,084        138,833        142,370        140,237        165,699        225,094        243,553        295,170        412,760        561,229        660,003         
India 34,707          37,942          41,432          42,980          46,979          51,523          50,392          56,517          71,238          97,331          134,831           
Source: WTO (2007). 
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Table 3: CIBS’ weight in world trade 
Exports Imports Exports Imports
China 3 3 7.3 6.1 9 7 3.0 3.5
India 29 17 0.9 1.3 12 15 2.2 2.1
Brazil 23 28 1.1 0.7 35 28 0.6 0.9
South Africa 39 34 0.5 0.6 38 37 0.4 0.5
Rank in world trade
Merchandise Commercial  services
Share in world 
total exports
Share in world 
total imports 
Share in world 
total exports
Share in world 
total imports 
Rank in world trade
 
Source: WTO statistics (2007). 
Table 4: CIBS’s main export commodities, 2005 (in USD thousands) 
Exports in value
Exports as a 
share of total 
exports (%)
Number of exported 






85 Electrical, electronic equipment 172,313,776 22.6 279 1.7 -12
84 Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors, etc, 149,694,351 19.6 488 1.4 16
62 Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet 35,030,828 4.6 119 3.2 14
61 Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet 30,870,775 4.1 114 3.3 13
90 Optical, photo, technical, medical, etc. apparatus 25,479,425 3.3 149 1.1 -13
00 All industries 761,953,410 100 4580 0
India
71 Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. 15,836,460 15.3151 36 8.2 2
27 Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc. 11,912,192 11.52 25 0.9 -35
62 Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet 5,456,382 5.2768 118 3.7 8
29 Organic chemicals 4,875,747 4.7152 262 1.8 2
26 Ores, slag and ash 4,469,717 4.3226 21 6.4 5
00 All industries 103,404,167 100 4062 0
Brazil
87 Vehicles other than railway, tramway 11,531,243 9.9297 58 1.1 5
84 Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors, etc. 9,726,564 8.3757 412 0.6 -8
72 Iron and steel 8,548,235 7.361 134 2.7 7
26 Ores, slag and ash 8,024,737 6.9102 14 10.2 7
02 Meat and edible meat offal 7,178,503 6.1815 30 10 7
00 All industries 116,128,845 100 3139 0
South Africa
71 Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. 8,539,958 18.1722 36 9.8 34
72 Iron and steel 5,770,052 12.2781 141 4.5 24
27 Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc. 4,894,440 10.4149 26 0.8 -8
87 Vehicles other than railway, tramway 4,119,293 8.7654 64 1 -3
84 Boilers, machinery; nuclear reactors, etc. 3,605,960 7.6731 396 0.6 -17
00 All industries 46,994,753 100 3159 0  
Notes: The Balassa Index, or index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA), measures the relative export 
specialization of individual countries across sectors with respect to the world average. If RCA> 1, then country is 
specialized in the sector relative to the world average. The Lafay Index measures each product’s contribution to the 
overall normalized trade balance of a country. Positive values of it indicate the existence of a comparative advantage; 
the larger the value, the higher the degree of specialization. Similarly, negative values indicate no specialization in a 
given sector or product. 
Source: Intracen (ITC) database.   15
Table 5: CIBS leading sectors in export of goods  
Share (%) World Rank Share (%) World Rank Share (%) World Rank Share (%) World Rank
Electronic  equipment  12,3 1 0,2 37 0,4 31 0,07  49
Machinery and mechanical 
appliances 
10,7 3 0,3 33 0,7 27 0,2 37
Articles of apparel, 
accessories, knit or crochet
24,5 1 2,5  7 0,1 57 0,07  76
Articles of apparel, 
accessories, not knit or 
crochet
23,8 1 3,7  5 0,1 66 0,05  82
Natural or cultured pearls, 
precious stones, metals, 
coins
2,9  13 8,2 4 0,4  26 4,4 7
Organic  chemicals 4,4 10 1,4 15 0,7 22 0,3 33
Iron and steel  5,3  5 1,3  22 3 12 2 16
Ores, slag and ash  1,6  11 6,4  4 11,4  3 3,4  9
Optical, photografic, 
cinematographic, etc. 
7,8  4 0,2 32 0,1 36 0,01  42
Vehicles  1,8 13 0,4 26 1,3 18 0,4 25
Mineral fuels, mineral oils and 
distillation products
1,3 27 0,8 31 0,5 38 0,3 50
Product
China India Brazil South Africa
 
Source: Intracen (ITC) database. 
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Table 6: CIBS’ main competitors (for the top five exports of each country) 
Product
China - main competitors (2005)
Electronic equipment  USA  Japan  Germany  Korea  Mexico  Malesia
Machinery and mechanical appliances  Germany  USA  Japan  Korea  Mexico  Malesia
Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet  Italy  Germany  France  Turkey  Bangladesh  India
Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or 
crochet
 Italy  Germany  France  India  Turkey  Mexico
Optical, photographic, cinematographic, etc. USA  Germany  Japan  Korea  Mexico  Malesia
India - main competitors (2005)
Natural or cultured pearls, precious stones, 
metals, coins









Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or 
crochet
Italy Germany  France China Turkey Mexico
Organic  chemicals USA Belgium  Ireland China  Saudi  Arabia
Russian 
Federation
Ores, slag and ash Australia  USA  Canada  Chile  Brazil  Peru
Brazil - main competitors (2005)
Vehicles Germany Japan  USA  Korea   Mexico  China
Machinery and mechanical appliances  Germany  USA  Japan  China  Korea  Mexico





Ores, slag and ash Australia  USA  Canada  Chile  India Peru




South Africa - main competitors (2005)
Natural or cultured pearls, precious stones, 
metals, coins













Machinery and mechanical appliances  Germany  USA  Japan  China  Korea  Mexico
Vehicles Germany Japan  USA  Korea  Mexico  China
Top 3 Industrialized countries Top 3 Developing countries 
 
Note: Hong Kong and Taiwan are not taken into consideration as competitors for China. 
Source: Intracen (ITC) database.   17
Table 7: CIBS’ regional agreements before and after 2000 by country/region 
Number of Agreements   








Brazil* 5 5 1  11 
India 6  7  8  21 
China 0 7 3  10 
South Africa  2  2  7  11 
Total 13  21  19  53 
 
Note: *Including those negotiated jointly with other Mercosur countries. 
Source: Antkiewicz and Whalley (2005). 
 